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Understanding Serious Bodily or




What is genocide? The typical answer immediately brings to mind
incidents of large-scale killings like those in World War II, Rwanda,
and Srebrenica. The same images, however, create an incomplete and
potentially misleading picture of the crime. Genocide is a far broader
concept than mass executions. The crime was deliberately designed to
capture the variant and innumerable ways individuals or
organizations might try to destroy racial, ethnic, religious, or national
groups. And while certain acts, like rape and other acts of sexual
violence, never formed part of the crime's initial understanding, these
acts are now accepted as tools of destruction and part of our
understanding on how genocides have and may occur.
How we understand these issues and genocide largely depends on
our exploration of the underlying act of serious bodily or mental harm.
The reason being that no other underlying act is as broad and
potentially limitless. By its very terms, the actus reus captures any
conduct capable of causing the requisite level of harm of "seriousness."
And this breadth has given international courts flexibility to further
our understanding of genocide, including the relationship between
sexual violence, displacement crimes, and the ways g~nocidaires
attempt to destroy the protected groups.
Despite the central importance of the underlying act to
understanding enocide, academics and commentators have largely
failed to discuss the direct issues explored in relation to serious bodily
or mental harm.
*The author is a trial attorney with the Office of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the Prosecutor or the ICC in
general. In 2016, a version of this paper was awarded the Morris Prize for the Best
Dissertation by Oxford University. The author would like to thank Peter Kremer,
Michelle Jarvis, Patricia Sellers, Todd Schneider, Ingrid Elliot, Giulia Pinzauti,
Matthew Cross, Grace Harbour, and Gabriela Santana for their wisdom and
contributions that went into this Article.
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This Article attempts to fill that gap by conducting an extensive
study and analysis of the UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide's legislative history and judicial
decisions by international courts and tribunals. Through that
analysis, this Article evaluates emerging controversies and
jurisprudential problems about the act and tries to resolve them in a
manner that accords with the Convention's spirit and a faithful
reading of subsequent judicial decisions. In that analysis, it shows
there exists a tension between jurists who evaluate the act by strictly
looking at its broad, but plain, terms and those who interpret the act
in view of its context, namely as an act that must be capable of
fulfilling the crime's destructive aims. In these regards, the act takes
on a character beyond its simple terms, and engages the very issue of
what genocide means and entails.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The historic understanding of genocide immediately alludes to
the repositories of egregious acts perpetrated on a large scale. The
mass execution of European Jews in World War II. Their starvation
and torture. The destruction of Jewish homes, artifacts, and
businesses in Eastern Europe. The demeaning and hateful rhetoric of
Nazi leaders. The mass and systematic slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda
in 1994-roughly eight hundred thousand in the first six weeks of the
conflict alone. The separation, torture, coordinated killing, mass
burial, and disguised reburial of over eight thousand Bosnian Muslim
men and boys from Srebrenica in just over two weeks.
Invariably, we think about circumstances where thousands of
individuals were killed, mistreated, and abused, and all with the
intention of destroying the larger religious, racial, national, or ethnic
group to which they belonged. And while these cases are without
doubt examples of genocide, they also inspire misconceptions in the
popular understanding of the crime. In law, genocide does not require
mass killings, let alone one killing. Genocide simply requires the
commission of one of the underlying acts of genocide coupled with the
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group. Genocide need not occur over a short period
or during war. Genocide need not be systematic or coordinated.
Genocide does not require hate speech. Instead, genocide is a far more
dynamic and multifaceted crime: one deliberately designed to capture
the variant ways individuals or organizations might seek to destroy a
protected group.
This more dynamic and broad understanding is exemplified by
genocide being committed through the commission of any act
resulting in serious bodily or mental harm-Article II(b) of the
Genocide Convention (Convention). For instance, in Srebrenica,
genocide was not just committed against the men and boys killed, but
also against the women, children, and elderly who survived but were
subject to mental and physical abuse. Similarly, in Rwanda, the
victims of genocide included the men and women raped, the
individuals beaten and tortured, and those who had no option but to
leave the country.
Serious bodily or mental harm is not defined in the Convention
or any treaty that includes the crime. The phrase is inherently vague
and inherently broad. Unlike the other enumerated acts of genocide-
killing members of the group, forcibly transferring children, creating
conditions of life deliberately calculated to bring about the
destruction of the group, and putting into place measures intended to
prevent births-the actus reus of serious bodily or mental harm is not
a discrete or individual act in and of itself. Rather, it encompasses a
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category of acts, namely any act causing the predicate level of harm
("serious"), including those neither stipulated nor discussed in the
legislative history and those deliberately excluded by the
Convention's framers. How we understand genocide, its breadth and
scope, largely depends on how we understand the limits and contours
of serious bodily or mental harm, for no other actus reus of genocide is
as potentially limitless.
Despite the significance of the actus reus, there is little
comprehensive scholarly discussion on Article II(b). Most
commentaries relating to "serious bodily or mental harm" concentrate
on the origin of the provision and its relationship to the Nazi torture
and medical experimentation regime, or more recently to including
sexual violence. Many commentaries simply outline the jurisprudence
on the actus reus without exploring its origin, effects, or problems.
This Article attempts to fill that gap by comprehensively
defining the actus reus of "serious bodily or mental harm" by looking
at its constituent elements. The analysis first evaluates the mental
element specific to the actus reus (Part II). Second, it defines "bodily"
and "mental" harm (Part III). Last, it defines the threshold
requirement of "serious" (Part IV). In each Part, this Article draws
from the primary sources of international law, as summarized in
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
For each Part, this Article outlines the relevant legislative history
and judicial decisions and emerging controversies and jurisprudential
problems. It tries to resolve those issues in a manner which accords
with the Convention's spirit and a faithful reading of subsequent
judicial decisions, particularly by those international courts and
tribunals who addressed the law on genocide.
II. THE MENTAL ELEMENT REQUIRED FOR SERIOUs BODILY OR MENTAL
HARM
Genocide is a crime with two mental elements.' There is the
specific intent (dolus specialis)-the defining feature of the crime
2 -
that requires any genocidal act be committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a group protected by the Convention.
3 A
detailed explanation of the dolus specialis deserves far more space
1. Kai Ambos, What Does 'Intent to Destroy' in Genocide Mean?, 91 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 833, 834 (2009).
2. See Prosecutor v. Jelisik, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 1 66 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999) (explaining that the mens rea is what
distinguishes the crime of genocide from other crimes).
3. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, T 187
(Feb. 27).
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than that available in this Article and distracts from the Article's
narrower focus, thus the author directs the reader's attention to the
sources identified in the accompanying footnote.4
Besides the dolus specialis, the general intent requirement
applies to the objective elements (actus reus) of the offense. It
requires that serious bodily or mental harm be the product of a
volitional act or omission that intentionally, or knowingly, produces
the relevant harm. As summarized in the ILC's commentary to the
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
[tihese are not the type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as
a result of mere negligence. However, a general intent to commit one of the
enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of the probable
consequences of such an act with respect to the immediate victim or victims is
not sufficient for the crime of genocide.5
This requirement was confirmed by the ICJ6 and the two ad hoc
tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR.7 As noted by Paola Gaeta, the
jurisprudence of these courts "[a]ccord[s] to the general standards of
liability." 8 In practical terms, the general intent requirement
precludes responsibility for harms produced by negligent or reckless
conduct, or those the result of involuntary acts. On the other hand, it
permits responsibility for harms that a person is aware are
4. See generally Ambos, supra note 1 (explaining that the "intent to destroy"
requirement in the crime of genocide is traditionally viewed as a specific intent);
Roberta Arnold, The Mens Rea of Genocide Under the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 14 CRIM. L.F. 127 (2003) (analyzing issues of clarity of mens rea
requirements); David Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J.
231 (2002) (analyzing the current definition of genocide with particular focus on the
intent requirements); William A. Schabas, The Jelisi6 Case and the Mens Rea of the
Crime of Genocide, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 125 (2001) (analyzing the decision in
Prosecutor v. Jelisic); Otto Triffterer, Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in
Whole or in Part the Group as Such, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 399 (2001) (explaining the
necessary components of the crime of genocide).
5. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10, at 44 (1996) [hereinafter Int'l Law Comm'n].
6. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶¶ 186-88
(highlighting the required elements of the crime of genocide).
7. The ICTY refers to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, and the ICTR to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (stating that a crime done with the intent to destroy a
social group of people can be genocide, even if not a physical destruction); Prosecutor v.
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 59 (June 7, 2001) (stating that
serious harm requires more than minor impairment).
8. Florian Jessberger, The Definition and the Elements of the Crime of
Genocide, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION 87, 97 (Paola Gaeta ed., 2009).
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consequences that would ordinarily occur in the course of events
because of his or her conduct.9
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES "BODILY" OR "MENTAL" HARM
The actus reus of serious bodily or mental harm self-evidently
concerns only two types of harm: bodily and mental. This Part
evaluates those two types (Part III.A and III.B) and identifies some
general evidentiary principles that apply to proving either one (Part
III.C). For these purposes, some brief comments on how the
Convention was drafted are necessary.
In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly tasked the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with drafting
a genocide treaty.'0 ECOSOC delegated the responsibility of
preparing a first draft to the United Nations Secretary-General, who
in turn appointed John Humphrey, Director of the UN Division of
Human Rights, to fulfill that task." Humphrey was assisted by
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer responsible for coining the
word "genocide"; Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, a judge in the
Nuremberg trials; and Vespasian V. Pella, the former President of the
Committee on Legal Questions of the League of Nations. Together,
the four prepared the Convention's first draft, also known as the
"Secretariat Draft."1
In 1947, the Secretariat Draft was reviewed by a seven-state ad
hoc committee appointed by ECOSOC,13 which, in May 1948,
produced a new draft of the Convention.'4 The UN General Assembly
referred the ad hoc committee draft to its standing committee for
legal issues, the Sixth Committee, comprising of a representative
from each United Nations member state.'5 Finally, on December 2,
1948, the Sixth Committee produced a text of the Convention,'
6
which was ratified by states and entered into force in 1951.
9. See Ambos, supra note 1, at 834-36 (analyzing the general and specific
intent requirements of the crime of genocide).
10. G.A. Res. 96 (LV), at 189 (Dec. 11, 1946).
11. ESCOR Res. 47, U.N. Doc. E/437 (1947).
12. ESCOR Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/447 (June
26, 1947) [hereinafter Draft Convention].
13. See ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Rep. of the Comm. and Draft
Convention Drawn Up by the Comm. (Dr. Karim Azkoul (Rapporteur)), U.N. Doc.
E/794, at 3 (May 24, 1948) [hereinafter Azkoul] (providing the seven-person committee
and their task).
14. See id. at 4-5 (detailing the proposals submitted in drafting the convention).
15. See JOHN B. QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 24 (2006) (explaining the
process of enacting the genocide treaty).
16. G.A. Res. 260 (CLXXIX), at 174 (Dec. 9, 1948).
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A. The Commission of Acts Resulting in Bodily Harm
Bodily harm first emerged in the ad hoc committee draft,
whereupon recommendation from the French delegation the actus
reus of "impairing the physical integrity of members of the group" was
included.'7 During Sixth Committee deliberations, the phrase was
changed to "bodily harm" upon suggestion by United Kingdom
delegates who considered "physical integrity" to be too "vague."'8 This
change likely limited the ultimate ambit of the act. The civil law
protection against lintigrit physique, from where the French
proposal probably originated, is a broader concept than the common
law concept of "bodily harm."'9 Lintigrit physique protects against
any act that might violate the respect or dignity of a person's body,
including conduct that fails to cause any physical or visible harm.20
The phrase "bodily harm" remained in the final text of the
Convention. However, neither the specific acts leading to, nor the
harms encompassing, "bodily harm" were discussed during the
Convention's deliberations.
The ad hoc tribunals have taken advantage of this lack of
guidance to find that there is no exhaustive list of acts capable of
causing bodily harm and that "serious bodily harm should be
determined on a case-by-case basis, using a common sense
approach."2 ' As a general rubric, the Kayishema Trial Chamber
defined bodily harm as "harm that seriously injures the health,
causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external,
internal organs or senses."2 2 The Seromba Appeals Chamber
17. Azkoul, supra note 13, at 13.
18. U.N. GAOR Sixth Committee, United Kingdom: Amendments to articles II
and III of the draft convention on genocide, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/222 (Oct. 7, 1948); see also
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 65 (1960).
19. See, e.g., CODE PtNAL [C. PtN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 211-1 (Fr.) (defining the
actus reus for the crime of genocide).
20. Most civil law jurisdictions retain the phrase "l'intdgrit6 physique" in their
national laws on genocide. See, e.g., 1994 CONST. art. 78 (Belg.); Decreto No. 2.889, de 1
de Outubro de 1956, Didrio Official da Uniho [D.O.U.] de 2.10.1956 (Braz.); CODE
PkNAL art. 313 (Burkina Faso); C6DIGO PENAL art. 101 (Colom.); C6DIGO PENAL art.
116 (Cuba); Id.; CODE PENAL art. 30 (Mali); CODIGO PENAL PORTUGURS art. 239 (Port.);
CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 757, RS 311, art. 264
(Switz.). See also Elizabeth Santalla Vargas, An Overview of the Crime of Genocide in
Latin American Jurisdictions, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 441, 451 (2010) (highlighting that
the crime of genocide has been found even in the absence of evidence of a physical
destruction of a group).
21. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 108 (May 21,
1999); see also Caroline Fournet, The Actus Reus of Genocide, in ELEMENTS OF
GENOCIDE 53, 61 (Paul Behrens & Ralph Henham eds., 1st ed. 2012) (noting that the
ICTR employs a case-by-case determination of serious mental harm).
22. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 1 10; see also Prosecutor v. Muvunyi,
Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgment, ¶ 487 (Sept. 12, 2006) (noting that the crime of
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considered that "[t]he quintessential examples of serious bodily harm
are torture, rape, and non-fatal physical violence that causes
disfigurement or serious injury to the external or internal organs."23
Other acts found to result in bodily harm include inhumane24 and
degrading treatment,25 deportation,2 6 enslavement,27 starvation,28
persecution,29 and interrogations combined with beatings.30 In
genocide's requirement of serious bodily harm may include injuries that are not
permanent or irremediable).
23. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, 1 46 (Mar. 12,
2008); see Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶
664 (Feb. 25, 2004) (explaining that the term serious bodily harm refers to acts of
physical violence that fall short of killing and that seriously injure the health, cause
disfigurement, or cause any serious injury to the body).
24. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 503
(Sept. 2, 1998) (noting that serious bodily harm includes inhumane treatment);
Prosecutor v. Blagojevid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 646 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005) (stating that inhuman[e] treatment may cause
serious bodily injury); Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 812
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) (holding examples of acts
causing serious bodily or mental harm include inhumane treatment); Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 51 (Dec. 6, 1999)
(interpreting serious bodily harm to include acts of inhumane treatment).
25. See, e.g., Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 504 (highlighting that acts of
degrading treatment may cause serious bodily harm); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No.
IT-99-36-T, Judgment, T 690 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004)
(explaining that causing serious bodily harm includes acts of degrading treatment);
Popovi6, Case No. IT-05-88-T, ¶ 812 (including degrading treatment in acts that may
cause serious bodily harm); Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 51 (interpreting
serious bodily harm to include acts of degrading treatment); Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case
No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 1 516 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31,
2003) (interpreting causing serious bodily harm to include acts of degrading
treatment); see also Prosecutor v. Karadlid, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61,
Review of the Indictments Pursuant o Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
¶ 25 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 11, 1996) (citing evidence of
degrading treatment causing serious bodily harm in genocide trial).
26. See Blagojevi6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 1 646 (citing decisions that hold
deportation to be among the acts that could cause serious bodily harm); Attorney
General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 340 (D.C. Jem. 1961) (holding that acts of genocide
include acts of deportation that caused serious bodily harm).
27. See Eichmann, Judgment, 36 I.L.R. at 340 (stating that acts enslavement
causing serious bodily injury were included in charges of genocide).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., id. (citing acts of persecution causing serious bodily harm as
evidence of the crime of genocide); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1 504 (holding
serious bodily harm to mean acts of persecution); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, T 156 (Jan. 27, 2000) (holding serious bodily harm to include
acts of persecution); Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 51 (understanding serious
bodily harm to include acts of persecution).
30. See, e.g., Blagojevi6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 646 (highlighting that serious
bodily harm is construed to include interrogations combined with beatings); Popovi6,
Case No. IT-05-88-T, ¶ 812 (stating that acts causing serious bodily harm include
interrogations combined with beatings).
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contrast, "heavy bruising" has been rejected as qualifying as "bodily
harm."31
The benefit of such breadth is that it ensures a progressive
understanding of the crime: one capable of capturing sophisticated
criminal regimes aimed at eradicating protected groups. As noted by
the Krsti6 Appeals Chamber, a ginocidaire does not need to "choose
the most efficient method to accomplish his objective of destroying the
targeted part" and may even select a method that "will not implement
the perpetrator's intent to the fullest, leaving that destruction
incomplete."3 2
This breadth also means that acts rejected or omitted by the
Convention's drafters are acts of genocide if they result in serious
bodily or mental harm. For instance, the Akayesu Trial Chamber
became the first court to recognize rape and other acts of sexual
violence as acts of genocide3 3 by finding they "are ... one of the worst
ways of inflict[ing] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily
and mental harm."34 Similarly, although the displacement of
populations was deliberately rejected by the Convention's drafters as
an underlying act of genocide-first in the Secretariat Draft35 and
again during Sixth Committee deliberationS36-the ICTY has found
that being forcibly transferred can cause serious bodily or mental
harm. As noted by the Krsti6 Appeals Chamber, "forcible transfer
[can] be an additional means by which to ensuie the physical
destruction of the [protected group] ."3" In relation to the Srebrenica
31. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 743 n.1801 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004).
32. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, T 32 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
33. See Sherrie Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 350, 351 (2003) (noting that the Rwandan Tribunal was the first international
criminal tribunal to find an individual guilty of genocide on the basis of acts of rape);
Guglielmo Verdirame, The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc
Tribunals, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q., 578, 595-96 (2000) (highlighting that an aspect of
the ad hoc Tribunal's jurisprudence on genocidal acts is recognizing that sexual
violence can be genocidal).
34. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, T 503 (Sept. 2,
1998); see also Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Pocar, ¶ 9 (Oct. 20, 2010) (noting that sexual violence is an act of
comparable gravity to rape in terms of mental harm).
35. See Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 24 (excluding mass displacements of
populations from acts constituting the crime of genocide).
36. See GAOR Sixth Committee, 88th Meeting, at 186-90, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR.82 (Oct. 23, 1948) (rejecting an amendment to include the forced transfer of
children in the crime of genocide).
37. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 1 31; see also Katherine Gallagher, The Second
Srebrenica Trial: Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic & Dragan Jokic, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
523, 537-38 (2005) (explaining that forced transfers of population can constitute
serious mental harm and result in the elimination of the population from an area).
2018] 1389
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
genocide, "[t]he transfer completed the removal of all Bosnian
Muslims from Srebrenica, thereby eliminating even the residual
possibility that the Muslim community in the area could reconstitute
itself."38 Similarly, the Tolimir Appeals Chamber recalled the impact
"the loss of relatives and friends and the forcible transfer" of the
Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica had on the survivors, concluding that
it met the required threshold for serious mental harm.39 Altogether,
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals underscores the broad reach
of the act.
B. The Commission of Acts Resulting in Mental Harm
Including mental harm as an act of genocide was a controversial
issue during the Convention's drafting, and its meaning was the
subject of significant dispute. China's delegate to the ad hoc
committee was the first to propose its inclusion to capture Japan's
use of narcotics against the Chinese during World War II as an act of
genocide.40 This argument failed to gain traction and "mental harm"
was omitted from the ad hoc committee's draft. China's delegate to
the Sixth Committee, however, repeated the request,41 arguing that
"Japan had committed numerous acts of that kind of genocide against
the Chinese population" and that "[i]f those acts were not as
spectacular as Hitlerite killings in gas chambers, their effect had
been no less destructive."42 China's proposal to the Sixth Committee
was rejected, but the inclusion of mental harm was eventually
adopted as part of an amendment proposed by India's delegate to the
Sixth Committee.43
Two outstanding questions emerge from the Convention's
legislative history. The first, whose answer now seems settled, is
whether mental harm was to be limited to harm caused by the use of
narcotics. This was the position taken by Dr. Nehemiah Robinson in
1960, director of the World Jewish Congress Institute for Jewish
Affairs and one of the foremost authorities on the Nazi Holocaust. In
his view, a study tracing the history of the Convention "would have
38. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A, $ 31.
39. Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, 1 654 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015).
40. See U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 28th mtg., at 6-7, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.25/SR.28 (June 9, 1948). For these reasons, China's delegate either abstained or
voted against proposals on the act before the Ad Hoc Committee.
41. See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 69th mtg., at 57, 59-60, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.69
(Oct. 7, 1948) (proposing to expand genocide to include crimes of impairing the physical
or mental health of members of the group); U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 81st mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (Oct. 22, 1948) [hereinafter GAOR 81st Meeting] (requesting to
include acts of genocide committed through narcotics).
42. GAOR 81st Meeting, supra note 41.
43. See infra Annex.
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made it absolutely clear that 'mental harm,' within the meaning of
the Convention, can be caused only by the use of narcotics."44
Several arguments, however, militate against his limited reading
of "mental harm." First, the text of the Convention is not limited to
mental harm caused by using narcotics. Second, the Chinese
delegation itself did not intend to limit mental harm to its own
historical experience. To the contrary, the Chinese delegation to the
Sixth Committee emphasized the need to create a Convention of
"universal scope" and, in that respect, cover harms of the "type" they
faced during World War II.45 Delegates from the Soviet Union equally
emphasized this, noting that the acts "were designed to serve only as
examples; they had been chosen on the basis of historical
considerations, being the acts most frequently committed by the
Nazis in the recent past."46 Third, attempts to limit the definition of
"mental harm" to that caused by using narcotics for purposes of
genocide prosecutions before the International Criminal Court
(ICC)47 were rejected by the Preparatory Committee establishing the
ICC.48 Finally, the ad hoc tribunals, principally the ICTY, have
concluded this restrictive interpretation is incorrect.49 While noting
that the "[r]eference to serious mental harm . . . appears to have been
restricted originally to the injection of pharmacological substances
44. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY ix
(1960) (emphasis added).
45. GAOR 81st Meeting, supra note 41.
46. Id. at 176.
47. See U.S. Delegation, Proposed Article on Genocide with Proposed Elements:
Article 20bis, 26 March 1996 (proposed addition to United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277),
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dl1788/pdfl [https://
perma.cc/33SK-58FX] (archived Sept. 18, 2018) (stating that mental harm means
permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture, or similar
techniques); U.S. Delegation, For Annex to Statute: Elements Related to Article on
Genocide, 26 March 1996 (proposed addition to United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277),
https://www.legal-tools.org/doclbb89ae/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/85NB-55WQ] (archived
Sept. 18, 2018) (stating that mental harm means permanent impairment of mental
faculties through drugs, torture, or similar techniques).
48. See Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held
From 11 to 21 February 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5 at 3 n.4 (Mar. 12, 1997)
(noting that mental harm means more than minor or temporary impairment of mental
faculties).
49. See Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 510 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (disagreeing with restrictive view of
mental harm); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 204 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015) (disagreeing with restrictive
definition of serious mental harm as an act of genocide).
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occasioning the serious impairment of mental facilities," the Krsti6
Trial Chamber refused to limit mental harm as such.50
The second question emerging from the legislative history is
whether mental harm must manifest physically. On this issue, the
perspectives of the Convention's drafters are less clear. Many of the
Sixth Committee delegates believed that including mental harm
would be redundant, as it was covered by bodily harm. This suggests
those delegates saw an overlap between the two concepts without
room for mental harm absent any physical manifestation. For
instance, Egypt's delegate noted that "the expression 'physical
integrity' could be interpreted as implying mental integrity as well."
5'
The delegate from the United Kingdom argued that "[i]f there were
no repercussions on physical health, it could not be said that a group
had been physically destroyed, that was to say that the crime of
genocide had been committed."5 2 The delegate from the United
States, while voting in favor of including mental harm, similarly
noted "that physical integrity also included mental integrity."53 From
this record, at least one commentator has concluded that "[t]hose who
voted against the inclusion of mental harm did so, not because they
had not considered acts seriously affecting mental integrity of a given
group as genocide, but because they thought physical integrity also
included mental integrity."
54
This was also the conclusion of many states during domestic
ratification debates. For instance, during hearings before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Charles Tillott, Chairman of
the American Bar Association Section on International and
Comparative Law, claimed that "[t]he meaning that the negotiators
intended to express was evidently pretty close to 'causing serious
bodily harm or mental incapacity."'5 5 This notion was repeated by
Edgar Turlington, then Treasurer of the American Society of
International Law, "[i]t is quite clear from the negotiations" that
"mental harm" is meant as "mutilation or disintegration of the
50. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶¶ 510-13 (Aug. 2, 2001) (holding that multiple
acts of genocide are among those that may cause serious mental harm).
51. GAOR 81st Meeting, supra note 41, at 178.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 179.
54. See Stephen Gorove, The Problem of "Mental Harm" in the Genocide
Convention, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 174, 180 (1951) (discussing the meaning of mental
harm in the crime of genocide).
55. The Genocide Convention: Hearings on Exec. 0 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. 247 (1950) (statement of Charles Tillott,
Chairman, Am. Bar Ass'n Section on Int'l & Comparative Law). See generally
LAWRENCE LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 99-104
(1991) (discussing the Committee of Foreign Relation's debate over the meaning of
mental harm in the convention).
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mind"56 and Adrian Fisher, the U.S. State Department's legal
advisor, who expressed
[i]t is clear from the legislative history of this language that what was meant
was not just embarrassment or hurt feelings, or even the sense of outrage that
comes from such action as racial discrimination or segregation, however,
horrible these may be. What was meant was permanent impairment of mental
faculty.5 7
As noted by Lawrence LeBlanc, "[i]n general the proponents of
ratification at the 1950 Senate hearings ... were prepared to accept
ratification with an understanding concerning 'mental harm."'58 This
the United States did. By Robert Cryer, "[o]wing to its concerns about
the possible breadth of the mental harm aspect of genocide,"5 9 the
United States filed an "understanding" that mental harm "means
permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or
similar techniques."6 0 The Canadians took an even narrower view. By
Nehemiah Robinson, "[t]he understanding of the (then) Canadian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, was that 'mental
harm' could not mean any-thing but physical injury to mental
faculties of the members of the group."61
Several arguments undermine this limited understanding of
mental harm. First, again, nothing in the Convention limits mental
harm to that which manifests physically. Second, the Convention
expressly delineates between acts causing bodily harm versus those
causing mental harm. As noted by Gaeta, "[t]he wording of the
definition . . . places the two modalities of conduct on an equal
footing."62 Requiring mental harm to manifest physically would
render meaningless its very inclusion since it would be covered by the
protection against bodily harm. Third, the ad hoc tribunals have
indirectly rejected this limitation. For example, the Blagojevi6 Trial
Chamber concluded that individuals who survived the mass
56. The Genocide Convention, Hearings on Exec. 0 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. 250 (1950) (statement of Edgar Turlington,
Treasurer, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law).
57. Id. at 263-64 (statement of Adrian Fisher, Legal Advisor, State Dep't).
58. LEBLANC, supra note 55, at 102; see generally Lawrence LeBlanc, The
United States and the Genocide Convention: The Sovereignty Package in Perspective, in
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE LEGACY OF 60 YEARS 173 (H.G. van der Wilt et al.
eds., 2012) (discussing the United States' understanding of the crime of genocide).
59. ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH
WTLMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
215 (2d ed. 2010).
60. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as of 31
December 2003, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/22, 126 (2003); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1091.
61. ROBINSON, supra note 44, at 65 n.32.
62. Jessberger, supra note 8, at 98.
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executions around Srebrenica were subjected to acts causing serious
mental harm, despite making no finding that the harm manifested
physically. The Chamber reasoned that "[t]he fear of beingcaptured,
and, at the moment of the separation, the sense of utter helplessness
and extreme fear for their family and friends' safety as well as for
their own safety, is a traumatic experience from which one will not
quickly-if ever-recover."6 3 The Chamber also noted that the same
men suffered mental harm when "having their identification
documents taken away from them, seeing that they would not be
exchanged as previously told, and when they understood what their
ultimate fate was."64 Again, no showing that the harm manifested
physically was required.
As compared to "bodily harm," there is far less jurisprudence
dedicated to defining the contours of mental harm. Eliav Lieblich
reasons that
[a] plausible explanation for this tendency is that in practice, tribunals
virtually always deal with cases that involve bodily harm, and therefore do not
find it necessary to address mental harm independently. Not unlike the notion
of 'terror' under IHL, mental harm has been treated, if at all, as an extension of
physical harm, which relieved tribunals of the need to discuss it extensively.
6 5
Leiblich also notes that "rather than elaborating on the essence of
mental harm, tribunals generally prefer to enumerate acts that might
cause such harm, which are unsurprisingly, acts that can also cause
physical harm."66
The ad hoc tribunals have noted that the list of acts capable of
resulting in serious mental harm is nonexhaustive and determined
"on a case-by-case basis."67 As a general rubric, mental harm need not
be "permanent or irremediable"68 and "is understood to mean more
than the minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties."69 There
63. Prosecutor v. Blagojevid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 647 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005).
64. Id.
65. Eliav Lieblich, Beyond Life and Limb: Exploring Incidental Mental Harm
Under International Humanitarian Law, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES 207 (Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto &
Derek Jinks eds., 2014).
66. Id.
67. Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 1 738 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012).
68. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, T 510 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001); see Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No.
ICTR-05-88-T, Judgment, T 159 (June 22, 2009); Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No.
ICTR-2001-66-J, Judgment, T 317 (Dec. 13, 2006).
69. Rep. of the Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal
Court, Part 2, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/Add.1, at 11 n.3 (Apr. 14, 1998); see also Blagojevi6, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
T 645; Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, 1 291 (June 17,
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is also a distinction between "[s]erious mental harm" and "emotional
or psychological damage or attacks on the dignity of the human
person not causing lasting impairment."70 The difference is that
serious mental harm must involve "some type of impairment of
mental faculties or harm that causes serious injury to the mental
state of the victim."7 1
With respect to specific types of acts recognized by courts as
causing mental harm, they include threats of death and knowledge of
impending death;7 2 acts causing intense fear or terror;73 surviving
killing operations;74 forcible displacement;7 5 and "mental torture."76
Acts that result in bodily harm have also been recognized as causing
mental harm. As noted by Roger O'Keefe, "[m]any of the sorts of acts
that one might expect to be prosecuted under the rubric of genocide
will qualify as both serious bodily harm and serious mental harm."7 7
This is particularly true regarding acts of sexual violence. As
explained by the Quebec Superior Court in its Munyaneza Judgment,
"[r]ape and sexual violence constitute serious bodily or mental harm
to a person."7 8 Gaeta agrees: "[t]he destructive psychological effects of
crimes of sexual violence are . . . granted the same importance as the
physical consequences of the acts."7 9 In contrast, yelling and
threatening words have been found not to subject the victim to
serious mental harm, absent evidence that the victim was any more
2004); Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgment, T 762 (July 14,
2009); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 321-22 (May 15,
2003).
70. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, T 510.
71. Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment, ¶ 502 (Apr.
28, 2005).
72. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, TT 290-91;
Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, T 206.
73. R. v. Munyaneza, 2009 QCCS 2201, para. 89 (Can. Que.).
74. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ¶ 207; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro,
2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, TT 290-91.
75. Prosecutor v. Krajiinik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 862 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006); Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ¶ 209.
76. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 504 (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, T 51 (Dec. 6, 1999).
77. ROGER O'KEEFE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 148 (2015).
78. Munyaneza, 2009 QCCS 2201, para. 94 (emphasis added); see also Fannie
Lafontaine, Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act on Trial: An
Analysis of The Munyaneza Case, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 269, 278-80 (2010) (discussing
analysis of serious bodily or mental harm which can be caused by sexual violence).
79. PAOLA GAETA, THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION 99 (Oxford Univ. Press
2009).
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than frightened by the conduct.8 0 Further, a "state of anxiety" was
found not to be mental harm.81
Finally, the Tolimir Appeals Judgment requires that mental
harm be "lasting."82 Where this requirement is derived from is
unclear. Neither the prosecution nor Tolimir addressed this issue
during their submissions on appeal. The Tolimir Appeals Chamber
also fails to cite anything supporting the requirement. Judge Sekule's
dissenting opinion appears correct: "this is a new requirement which
is not as such supported by the jurisprudence."8 3 The requirement
also appears at odds with the principle that mental harm "need not
be permanent and irremediable."84 Indeed, it is difficult to think of
any harm that is "lasting" but "not permanent or irremediable."
Finally, as noted by Judge Sekule, "the definition of serious mental
harm does not centre around the question of the duration of the
harm, but the nature of the harm that is inflicted and whether it is
such as to instill strong fear, terror, intimidation or threat, as set out
in the applicable authorities."85 This is true. Until the Tolimir Appeal
Judgment, the jurisprudence of the ICTY focused on the character of
the harm and its effect on the victim, not its duration.
There is one way to reconcile the position of the Tolimir Appeals
Chamber with the prior jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. That is
to view the term "lasting" as another way of framing the requirement
that mental harm be "more than the minor or temporary impairment
of mental faculties."86 This interpretation remains consistent with the
principle that mental harm need not be permanent or irreparable. It
also follows the Krsti6 Trial Judgment from where the term "lasting"
appears to originate-despite the Tolimir Appeals Chamber's failure
to cite the case. In Krsti6, the Trial Chamber differentiated between
serious mental harm and mental damage "not causing lasting
impairment."8 7 The Trial Chamber incorporated this distinction into
its broader definition of "serious" harm (both for bodily and mental
harm), namely that such harm causes "grave and long-term
disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and constructive
life."88
80. Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment, 1 261 (Feb.
27, 2009).
81. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, ¶f 47-48
(Mar. 12, 2008).
82. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ¶ 203.
83. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Sekule, T 8 (Apr. 8, 2015).
84. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ¶ 203.
85. Id.
86. See Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, ¶ 46.
87. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, T 510 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (emphasis added).
88. Id. ¶ 513.
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C. General Evidentiary Principles for Proving Bodily or Mental Harm
Several overarching evidentiary principles apply when proving
bodily or mental harm. These are besides the specific rules on
evidence unique to each international or national court. First, serious
bodily or mental harm requires "proof of a result."8 9 This is in
contrast with the underlying act of deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part, which "does not require that a result
was attained."9 0
That result can be proved through eliciting direct evidence, such
as medical records or the victim's own statement, that the victim
suffered bodily or mental harm. It can also, however, be established
through circumstantial evidence. As the Rukundo Trial Chamber
opined, a court "may draw inferences from the evidence presented."9 1
There, the Chamber acknowledged that it lacked direct evidence on
the witness's mental state following her sexual assault "apart from
her testimony that she could not tell anyone about the incident."92
The Chamber, however, evaluated the circumstances urrounding the
sexual assault and determined that the victim must have suffered
serious mental harm due to her assault.9 3 The Chamber noted that it
was "necessary to look beyond the sexual act in question and . . .
particularly important to consider the highly charged, oppressive and
other circumstances surrounding the sexual assault."9 4 In that
respect, the Chamber considered the victim's sexual inexperience, her
vulnerable position, and that she had sought protection from the
accused for herself and her family because he was a "familiar and
trusted person of authority and of the church," and that the accused
threatened the victim and carried a firearm.95
Second, in assessing whether bodily or mental harm was
inflicted, the analysis is a "holistic" one.96 Acts are not evaluated in a
piecemeal fashion to determine whether each act, in isolation, causes
the requisite bodily or mental harm. Rather, bodily or mental harm
89. Prosecutor v. Popovi6, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, T 811 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-
24-T, Judgment, T 514 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003).
90. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, ¶ 811; Staki6, Case No, IT-97-24-T, ¶ 517.
91. Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment, ¶ 388 (Feb.
27, 2009).
92. Id. TT 388-89.
93. Id.
94. Id. T 388.
95. Id.
96. Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-A, Notice of Filing of Redacted Public
Version of Prosecution Response to Zdravko Tolimir's Appeal Brief, ¶ 78 (Mar. 10,
2014).
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can arise from "all the relevant acts perpetrated"97 (i.e., the totality of
circumstances). For instance, in Tolimir, the Appeal and Trial
Chambers found that the harm suffered by Bosnian Muslim women,
children, and the elderly did not arise strictly from their forcible
transfer, but from the entire experience causing that harm, including
the "painful separation process from their male family members at
Poto6ari, the fear and uncertainty as to their fate and that of their
detained male relatives, and the appalling conditions of the journey to
Muslim-held territory by bus and on foot" and "the continuation of
their profound trauma [and] the financial and emotional difficulties
they faced in their 'drastically changed' lives following the forcible
transfer."98
No court, however, has articulated the causal relationship
required between the acts and the harm. Take the situation of
Srebrenica in Tolimir. In assessing the mental harm inflicted upon
the Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly displaced from
Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber considered several acts and omissions
by different actors taking place over a broad spectrum of time: the
attack on Srebrenica, the separation at Poto6ari, the displacement
itself, and the attending absence of the community's fathers and sons
killed.99 It also considered the consequences of those acts, such as
losing a permanent home and the emotional and financial support
borne by killing the Bosnian Muslim men and boys, particularly given-
the patriarchal nature of the Bosnian Muslim society.oo The
Chamber concluded that it was the entirety of those acts and their
consequences that subjected the Bosnian Muslim women, children,
and elderly to serious mental harm.101
Without articulating any causal standard, the test implicitly
endorsed by the Trial Chamber appears to be one that requires the
accused's acts, or those linked to the accused, be a direct and
proximate cause of the bodily or mental harm. In Srebrenica, the
conduct of the Bosnian Serb forces in and around Srebrenica was a
"direct" cause of the mental harm suffered by the Bosnian Muslims as
"but for" those acts the mental harms would not have occurred. The
harms were also proximately caused by each act because they were
all foreseeable consequences of the killing operation and the
separation and displacement of the Bosnian Muslim women, children,
and elderly. A requirement that the harm be a direct and proximate
97. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, ¶¶ 210-11; see also Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 647 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan.
17, 2005) (finding trauma and wounds suffered by those who managed to survive the
mass executions does constitute serious bodily and mental harm).
98. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, 1 210.
99. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, ¶ 756.
100. Id. at ¶ 757.
101. Id. at ¶ 759.
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result of the acts also ensures that individuals are not held
responsible for harms divorced from the accused's conduct. It also
comports with general standards of causation commonly accepted
under international law. 102
Finally, a victim's suffering prior to his or her killing may
constitute serious bodily or mental harm, even if the victim's death is
also treated as fulfilling the actus reus of killing. Doing so does not
violate the principle of ne bis in idem103 as both acts-the killing and
serious bodily or mental harm-satisfy a single, not multiple,
genocide charge. The Tolimir Appeals Chamber, for instance, rejected
the defense's argument that mental harm suffered by the victims
immediately before their deaths could not constitute a separate act of
genocide.10 4 The Chamber accepted the prosecution's position that
"there is nothing to prevent a chamber from treating the harm
suffered prior to murder as a separate actus reus of genocide and that
it is proper to establish genocide under both [acts], since this
establishes the full extent of the defendant's culpable conduct."1 05
IV. THE THRESHOLD REQUIRED FOR "SERIOUS" HARM
Not all acts causing bodily or mental harm fulfill the
requirements of Article II(b) of the Convention. Only those acts
causing "serious" bodily or mental harm are acts of genocide. It is
that threshold-"seriousness"-that is the defining feature of the act
and, as reflected below, the subject of greatest ambiguity, debate, and
litigation-and for good reason. As reflected above, bodily and mental
harm are broad concepts. They capture any act capable of causing
that harm, be it minor cuts and lacerations or losing a limb. The
benefit of that breadth is that it incorporates acts going beyond mass
killing to more nuanced events, something envisaged by the
Convention's drafters.
That same breadth, however, is difficult to reconcile with the
Convention's purpose. Genocide is a crime aimed at the destruction of
a group. The Convention's drafters deliberately attempted to narrow
the acts causing genocide to those they believed could achieve that
result. That intent is evident in the specificity of the other
enumerated acts: killing, deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
102. See PETRA VIEBIG, ILLICITLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 192 (2016).
103. The international criminal law equivalent of the double jeopardy doctrine.
104. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, TT 194, 206.
105. Id. TT 198, 206.
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whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births, and
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Minor
cuts and lacerations, however widespread, could never achieve the
desired destructive result to a group. It would also appear contrary to
the aims of the Convention's drafters to, on one hand, be so specific
about genocidal acts yet, on the other, include an act broad enough to
subsume both enumerated and unenumerated acts of genocide. It
would obviate the need for any other stipulated act since any of them
could be subsumed into the contours of "serious bodily or mental
harm."
This dilemma has motivated much of the recent jurisprudence on
the act and how the threshold of "seriousness" is defined. For those
who believe that an act of genocide must relate to the destructive
nature of the crime, there is an incentive to make the threshold for
"seriousness" more demanding. For others, the limitation is not in the
act itself, but in the dolus specialis of the crime, obviating the need to
superficially elevate the "seriousness" threshold in lieu of a reading
comporting to the act's plain and ordinary meaning and without
conflating the actus reus and mens rea elements.
To analyze these issues, this Part first reviews the Convention's
legislative history as it relates to including the term "serious" (Part
IV.A) and then evaluates how international courts have addressed
this issue (Part IV.B). I
A. Legislative History of the Genocide Convention
None of the first proposals for the actus reus included a
"'seriousness" threshold for the apparent reason that they were
limited to specific acts. For instance, the Secretariat Draft was
limited to "mutilations and biological experiments imposed for other
than curative purposes"106 to comport with practices "current in
Hitlerite Germany."iO? This obviated the need for a qualitative
threshold.
Deliberations before the ad hoc committee also began with
discussions focused on specific acts. For instance, the United States
proposed changing the language to "physical violence, mutilations or
biological experiments"1os to "take care of other possible forms of
physical violence."09 The French delegation proposed a version not
tied to any specific act, so long as the act was "directed against the
106. See infra Annex.
107. ESCOR, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 25, U.N. Doc. E/447
(June 26, 1947) [hereinafter ESCOR, Draft Convention].
108. See infra Annex.
109. GAOR, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide: Communications
Received by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/401 (Oct. 18, 1947).
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corporal integrity of members of the group."11 0 This proposal was
adopted by the ad hoc committee, which emphasized the broad nature
of the act in its comments: "[t]his formula covers any acts, other than
killing, which have the common characteristic of including a direct
attack on the person of members of the group. (Blows and wounds,
torture, mutilation, harmful injections, biological experiments
conducted with no useful end in view etc.)."' The text was modified
to "any act impairing the physical integrity of members of the group"
upon recommendation by the ad hoc committee chairman,112
retaining the breadth provided by France's proposal.
Discussions before the Sixth Committee similarly focused on
more open-ended iterations of the act. Delegates from Belgium
repeated the ad hoc committee's proposal, recommending that the act
cover those which "impair[] physical integrity."11 3 The Soviets
similarly proposed a version containing no qualitative threshold: "the
infliction of physical injury or pursuit of biological experiments."114
The Sixth Committee never seriously considered those
recommendations as neither was actively debated nor discussed.
A threshold requirement only emerged towards the end of the
Sixth Committee's negotiations on the act with a proposal by the
United Kingdom that the language be modified to "causing grievous
bodily harm to members of the group."s1 5 United Kingdom delegate
Gerald Fitzmaurice reasoned,. "[i]t would not be appropriate to
include, in the list of acts of genocide, acts which were of little
importance in themselves and were not likely to lead to the physical
destruction of the group" and that the term "grievous" had a "precise
meaning" in English law.116 Upon recommendation by India's
delegate, the term "grievous" was changed to "serious."117 The
change, however, appears inconsequential, as noted by India's
delegate: "the basic idea of the amendment could be retained if the
word 'serious' were inserted.""18
Three conclusions arise from this history. First, members of the
ad hoc committee and the Sixth Committee favored a formulation of
the act broad enough to capture many acts, not just a select few. This
is apparent from the comments accompanying the ad hoc committee
110. See infra Annex.
111. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Commentary on Articles Adopted by
the Committee, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/W.1 (Apr. 26, 1948).
112. See infra Annex.
113. See infra Annex.
114. See infra Annex.
115. See infra Annex.
116. GAOR 81st Meeting, supra note 41, at 175, 178.
117. See infra Annex.
118. GAOR 81st Meeting, supra note 41, at 179.
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draft, which was also the first to propose an open-ended iteration of
the act not tied to specific conduct. Second, specifically because of this
breadth, a threshold requirement was included to limit the act.
Fitzmaurice's commentary is instructive-a threshold requirement
was seen as bringing the act in line with the crime's raison d'etre by
ensuring that acts "not likely to lead to the physical destruction of the
group" were not encompassed by the act. Third, despite the change
from "grievous" to "serious," this change was not intended to dilute or
remove the threshold requirement recommended by Fitzmaurice.
Although the Convention's drafters intended a threshold of
"'seriousness" to ensure that acts meeting the requisite level of harm
fell within the context of the crime, no further instruction was
provided on what specifically that threshold was. Egypt's delegate to
the Sixth Committee, Dr. Wahid Fikry Raafat, foreshadowed the
consequences of this ambiguity, explaining that adding "the word
'grievous' to define the kind of impairments of physical integrity ...
might give rise to a great many difficulties of interpretation in the
courts."1 19 Dr. Raafat could not have been more right. As illustrated
in the next Part, international courts have struggled with how to
define the term "serious," often producing contradictory
jurisprudence.
B. The Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICJ
As reflected in Part III, in their earlier cases the ad hoc tribunals
avoided precisely defining the term "serious," opting instead to take a
case-by-case approach. What "serious" means only recently became
the subject of litigation and judicial interpretation, culminating in the
April 2015 Tolimir Appeal Judgment. There, the Tolimir Appeals
Chamber noted that this definition of "serious" was "consistent with
the case law of the [ad hoc tribunals] and align[ed] with the letter
and spirit of the Genocide Convention":
[the harm] must be of such a serious nature as to contribute or tend to
contribute to the destruction of all or part of the group; although it need not be
permanent or irreversible, it must go "beyond temporary unhappiness,
embarrassment or humiliation" and inflict "grave and long-term disadvantage
to a person's ability to lead a normal and constructive life."
12 0
The purpose of this test is self-evident-it attempts to identify
the minimal threshold required for the act by narrowing the bookends
119. Id. at 178.
120. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 201-02 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015); see also Prosecutor v. Th6oneste Bagosora,
Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze & Anatole Nsengiyumva, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, T
2117 (Dec. 18, 2008).
[VOL. 51:13811402
SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARMAS GENOCIDE
of qualifying conduct. To better understand what this test means,
each of its components are evaluated by this Article below.
1. Harm that Goes "Beyond Temporary Unhappiness,
Embarrassment, or Humiliation"
The Krsti6 Trial Judgment was the first to hold that "serious
harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must
involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness,
embarrassment, or humiliation."1 2 1 A variation of this test was also
endorsed in the Baglishema Trial Judgment, which held that "serious
harm entails more than minor impairment on mental or physical
faculties."1 22
There is ambiguity on what "temporary unhappiness,
embarrassment, or humiliation" entails and there is no jurisprudence
elucidating the phrase. The test is likely limited to assessing whether
mental harm is sufficiently serious, even though the Krsti6 Trial
Chamber and later ICTY chambers have framed the test as also
applying to bodily harm. This is because the test only concerns the
psychological impact of certain acts, not their physical impact. The
test appears to be deliberately designed to ensure that victims of
PTSD meet the threshold of "serious mental harm." At least one
commentator has noted that "[t]he extent to which [this] definition[]
resemble[s] the [APA]'s criteria for PTSD is striking."1 23 To the end, a
reading of this provision that is most likely consistent with the
judges' intent is one where mental harm must be more than
"temporary unhappiness, embarrassment, or humiliation," but a
showing of physical harm requires no demonstrable psychological
impact.
2. Harm that Inflicts "Grave and Long-Term Disadvantage to a
Person's Ability to Lead a Normal and Constructive Life"
It was also the ICTY Krsti6 Trial Judgment that first determined
that while the harm need not be permanent or irremediable, it must
inflict "grave and long-term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead
a normal and constructive life."1 24 This analysis is entirely fact-
dependent and depends on the evidence in the case. For instance, the
121. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001).
122. Baglishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 59 (June 7, 2001).
123. Lieblich, supra note 65, at 185, 208; see also id. at 205-06 (summarizing the
diagnostic criteria for PTSD as established by the APA).
124. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, T 513.
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Karadiid Appeals Chamber concluded that Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat camp detainees in 1992 were subject to serious bodily
harm because the acts "resulted in serious injuries, including, inter
alia, rib fractures, skull fractures, jaw fractures, vertebrae fractures,
and concussions" and that the long-term effects included "tooth loss,
permanent headaches, facial deformities, deformed fingers, chronic
leg pain, and partial paralysis of limbs."
125
None of the ad hoc tribunals, however, have explained what a
"normal and constructive life" means and how certain harms may
impede that life. For instance, deportation and forcible transfer have
been found to impact an individual's ability to lead a normal and
constructive life.12 6 Yet, if the displaced individual can reconstruct
their life in another location, then arguably there is no "grave and
long-term disadvantage" to that person's ability to "lead a normal and
constructive life." The same is true about an individual whose injuries
can be medically remedied. This is not, however, how the ad hoc
tribunals have conducted their analysis. Instead, the ad hoc tribunals
largely pay lip-service to the above principle while accepting certain
harms that have no obvious hindrance on a person's ability to lead a
normal and constructive life.
In addition, recent ICTY jurisprudence conflates two distinct
concepts: the inability to lead a normal and constructive life and the
physical destruction of the group. For instance, the Tolimir Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the trauma and financial and emotional
consequences caused to the Bosnian Muslim women, children, and
elderly because of acts by the Bosnian Serb forces in and around
Srebrenica was such that it prevented them from leading a normal
and constructive life.' 2 7 The Appeals Chamber added that the "grave
and long-term disadvantage to the ability of the members of the
protected group to lead a normal and constructive life, so as to
threaten the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part."1
28
The Appeals Chamber's wording is problematic. The principle that
the act threatens the physical destruction of the group is vested in
the crime's dolus specialis, not its actus reus. But the two are casually
treated synonymously by the Appeals Chamber. Further, the position
of the Appeals Chamber contradicts the requirement, explored
further below, that the harm be so it only "tends to contribute" to the
destruction of the group.
125; Prosecutor v. KaradEi6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1, Reply Brief for
Appeal of Decision on Remand, ¶ 35 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug.
13, 2013).
126. See Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 513.
127. See Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 211 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015).
128. Id. ¶ 212.
[VOL. 51:13811404
SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARMAS GENOCIDE
3. Harm that "Contribute[s] or Tend[s] to Contribute to the
Destruction of All or Part of the Group"
The notion that the harm "must be of such a serious nature as to
contribute or tend to contribute to the destruction of all or part of the
group" is the most controversial and important aspect of recent
jurisprudence by the ad hoc tribunals. The test originates from the
International Law Commission's (ILC) commentary to the Draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, wherein the
ILC opined that the phrase "causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group" requires that "[t]he bodily harm or the mental
harm inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious
nature as to threaten its destruction in whole or in part."1 29 The ILC
fails to source the requirement or reference state practice, opinio
juris, or the Convention's legislative history. This becomes important
as the ILC's opinion is only a subsidiary means for determining
international law 3 0-legally persuasive only insofar as it assists in
determining whether a rule of international law exists.
Presumably, the ILC was contextualizing serious bodily or
mental harm by connecting it with the crime's raison d'tre: to protect
against acts threatening the destruction of a group. The ILC must
have known that serious bodily or mental harm serves as an
underlying act for other international crimes, such as torture or
inhumane treatment as a war crime or crime against humanity. So
what then differentiates bodily or mental harm as an act of genocide
versus an act of another international crime? It could be nothing. But
the ILC's commentary suggests there is a difference and that
difference is context: the fact that genocide is defined by its dolus
specialis.13 1 Therefore, an act incapable of bringing about that
destruction cannot, or at least should not, be an act of genocide.
The ILC test first finds reference in the jurisprudence of
international courts in two 2003 ICTR trial judgments: the May 15,
2003 Semanza Trial Judgment and the December, 1 2003 Kajelijeli
Trial Judgment. Neither case, however, endorses the ILC standard-
despite later ad hoc chambers claiming otherwise. The Semanza Trial
Chamber references the ILC standard to show why the standard
under customary international law-as reflected in the ICTR's
129. Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 5, at 46.
130. See Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.
Rep. 7, 38-56, ¶¶ 47, 50, 53, 79, 83 (Sept. 25) (explaining that the ILC opinion is
merely a factor in determining international law).
131. See Claus KreB, The Crime of Genocide Under International Law, 6 INT'L
CRIM. L. REV. 461, 471-72 (2006); Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Convention on
Genocide, 43 AM. J. INVL L. 738, 743 (1994).
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jurisprudence-is actually lower than that required by the ILC.13 2
The Kajelijeli Trial Chamber is neutral, reciting the ILC test without
opining one way or the other on whether it agrees with or endorses
the test.133 That recitation is also obiter dicta as the Kajelijeli
Chamber decides not to "consider the question whether the Accused
or his subordinates caused serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the Tutsi population."134
The first ad hoc chamber to accept the ILC's approach (despite
not referencing the ILC) is the Krajinik Trial Chamber. In Krajignik,
the Trial Chamber observes that the prosecution's indictment alleged
serious bodily or mental harm both as an act of genocide and a crime
against humanity.1 35 The Chamber decides there must be a difference
between the act depending on which crime it is used in, and that
difference lies with the context of the crime. That "in the context of
genocide the act must contribute, or tend to contribute, to the
destruction of the protected group or part thereof."136 The Trial
Chamber concludes this by noting that the four other underlying acts
of genocide all contribute or tend to contribute to a group's
destruction. For instance, the underlying act of killing has the impact
of tending to contribute to the destruction of the group. The Trial
Chamber fails to explain why, but the logic appears obvious: killing
results in the physical eradication of a group's members. The actus
reus of "inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction," as the Trial Chamber reasons, "by its
own terms must have, or tend to have, a destructive effect on the
group or the part."137 The Trial Chamber also concludes, without
explanation, that the acts of implementing measures to prevent
births in the group and transferring children out of the group also
contribute to a group's destruction. Presumably, the Trial Chamber
understood these acts destroy the group by undermining its future
viability.138
132. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, T 254 n.541
(May 15, 2003); see also L. J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA
TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (2005) (stating in the
Semanza judgment, the ILC uses a higher standard than its 1996 draft).
133. See Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment, ¶ 814 (Dec.
11, 2003).
134. Id. ¶ 844.
135. See Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 861 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 5, at 46 (noting that the transfer of
children would have serious consequences for the future viability of a group as such).
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The Trial Chamber then reasons that
a fair and consistent construction of [serious bodily or mental harm] alongside
the four other types of actus reus is that, in order to pass as the actus reus of
genocide . . . the act must inflict such "harm" as to contribute, or tend to
contribute, to the destruction of the group or part thereof.1 39
This method of interpretation follows Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which requires that the
terms of a treaty be interpreted in "good faith" and "in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms [of the treaty] in
their context and in light of its object and purpose."140 The Trial
Chamber finally concludes that "[h]arm amounting to 'a grave and
long-term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and
constructive life' has been said to be sufficient for this purpose."141 In
this sense, the Trial Chamber underlines that by adopting this test it
does not intend to heighten or alter the requirements for serious
bodily or mental harm from the previous jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals.
The test endorsed in Krajignik, while similar to, is arguably
different from the ILC test. This may explain why the Krajignik
Chamber omits any reference to the ILC's commentary even though
the similarity between the two tests suggests the Krajignik Chamber
was influenced by the ILC. A textual comparisoni of the two can be
found in the Figure below.
Figure 1: Comparison of ILC Commentary and Krajignik Trial
Judgment
ILC test Krajignik test
The act must be of such a serious The act must contribute, or tend
nature as to threaten its to contribute, to the destruction
destruction in whole or in part. of the protected group or part
thereof.
The ILC test appears more demanding by suggesting that the
harm must have actual or realized impact on the group. The
Krajignik test only requires that the act "tend to contribute," not
"threaten," the group's destruction. While the two tests are
139. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, T 862.
140. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
141. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 862 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case
No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2,
2001)).
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formulated differently, later ICTY and ICTR cases, as reflected below,
conflate the two tests. Both tests are now treated as interchangeable
iterations of the same standard applying the less demanding formula
provided in the Krajignik Trial Judgment.
Following the Krajignik Trial Judgment, the ICTR revisited the
issue in the Seromba Appeal Judgment. There, the Appeals Chamber
adopted the ILC formulation of the test, concluding that "[t]o support
a conviction for genocide, the bodily harm or the mental harm
inflicted on members of a group must be of such a serious nature as to
threaten its destruction in whole or in part."142 Unlike the Krajignik
Trial Chamber, the Seromba Appeals Chamber never explains why it
adopts this test. Instead, it cites three sources: the ILC Commentary,
the Kajelijeli Trial Judgment, and the Krajignik Trial Judgment.143
However, the ICTR's reliance on these sources is problematic. The
ILC itself substantiated no legal support for the requirement and the
Kajelijeli Trial Chamber never actually endorsed the test (and if it
did, it was in dicta). Further, the Krajignik Trial Chamber never
references either the ILC test or the Kajelijeli Trial Judgment and
proposes a test arguably different and more lenient.
The Seromba Appeals Chamber's failure to address these issues
or provide reasons for adopting the ILC test leaves much to be
desired. The most important lesson from Seromba is its treatment of
the ILC and Krajignik tests as the same. Following Seromba, later
ICTR and ICTY decisions endorsed the ILC/Krajignik Trial Chamber
test with greater frequency and, like Seromba, interchangeably.1
44
The test is now the settled law of the ad hoc tribunals.
The ICJ also adopted the ILCIKrajignik test in its Croatia
Genocide Judgment. There the ICJ determined that support for the
ILC/Krajignik test comes from "the context of Article II, and in
particular of its chapeau, and in light of the Convention's object and
142. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, T 46 (Mar. 12,
2008).
143. Id. at 19 n.117.
144. See generally Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-T, Judgment,
T 584 (Mar. 31, 2011); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgment,
¶ 633 (Jan. 22, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-T,
Judgment, ¶ 637 (Nov. 1, 2010); Prosecutor v. Karadiid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T,
Decision on Accused's Application for Certification to Appeal Denial of Motion For
Judgement of Acquittal Under Rule 98 BIS (Count 11), ¶ 7 (June 28, 2012); Prosecutor
v. Karemer and Ngirumpatse, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Judgment, ¶ 1609 (Feb. 2,
2012); Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et. al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment, T 5731
(June 24, 2011); Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, T 811 (Intl
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No.
ICTR-2001-70-T, Judgment, T 259 (Feb. 27, 2009); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-
05-88/2-T, Judgment, T 738 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012);
Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgment, T 202 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 8, 2015).
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purpose."145 The court also found support in the Convention's
legislative history. Referencing much of the legislative history
discussed above, the court noted that when proposing an amendment
to insert a qualitative threshold that the harm be "grievous,"
representatives from the United Kingdom noted that "[i]t would not
be appropriate to include, in the list of acts of genocide, acts which
were of little importance in themselves and were not likely to lead to
the physical destruction of the group"146 and that "the term 'grievous'
was eventually replaced by the term 'serious' in the English version of
the Convention [by the Indian delegation], without affecting the idea
behind the proposal of the representative of the United Kingdom."14 7
The ICJ also references the ILC Commentary and Krajignik Trial
Judgment. 148
The ICJ's reasoning is compelling. It complies squarely with the
rules on treaty interpretation provided for under Articles 31 and 32 of
the VCLT and appears consistent with the jurisprudence of the ad
hoc tribunals. Not surprisingly, therefore, that the ICJ's conclusion
and reasoning has since been adopted in the Tolimir Appeal
Judgment, which found that "[the ICJ] is the competent organ to
resolve disputes relating to the interpretation of [the Genocide
Convention]. It is also the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations and the community of nations at large."14 9
Two issues arise from this discussion. First, why the sudden
interest by the international courts on this issue? Note that the
Tolimir Appeal Judgment and ICJ Croatia Genocide Judgment were
issued within months of one another in 2015. And second, what does
this all mean? The answer to the first question is relatively
straightforward: it is a reaction to the earlier jurisprudence of the ad
hoc tribunals which adopted a wide understanding of which acts may
cause "serious bodily or mental harm," including "a whole series of
acts which were not initially covered by the conventional scope of the
application."'50 As confirmed by Payam Akhavan, "[t]he range of acts
mentioned in the jurisprudence underscores that the legal definition
of genocide is so broad (and indeterminate) that it is difficult to
145. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 118, T 157 (Feb. 3,
2015).
146. Id. (quoting GAOR 81st Meeting, supra note 41, at 175, 179).
147. Id.
148. See id. (referencing language such as "serious nature" and "serious harm").
149. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A at 83 n.580.
150. CAROLINE FOURNET, GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 92 (Hart
Publishing 2013).
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describe-notwithstanding the archetypal image of the Holocaust-
what a typical genocide actually 'looks like."'
151
The Tolimir Appeal Judgment and Croatia Genocide Judgment
try to push back this breadth out of concern that such a wide
understanding of the act dilutes the character of the act as noted by
earlier worries by the Convention's drafters. For instance, the
drafters of the Secretariat Draft sought to create a "careful definition
of the notion of genocide" out of fear that "there would be a tendency
to include under genocide international crimes or abuses which,
however reprehensible they may be, do not constitute genocide and
cannot be regarded as such by any normal process of reasoning."152
The drafters of the Secretariat Draft also noted that a 'literal
definition" of genocide "must be rigidly adhered to; otherwise there is
a danger of the idea of genocide being expanded indefinitely to
include the law of war, the right of peoples to self-determination, the
protection of minorities, the respect of human rights, etc."15 3 In
another note, the Secretariat expressed that "[t]he victim of the crime
of genocide is a human group. It is not a greater or smaller number of
individuals who are affected for a particular reason (execution of
hostages) but a group as such."15 4
On what this all means, the salient question is whether the test
now endorsed by the ICJ, ILC, and ad hoc tribunals creates a
quantitative or qualitative requirement. A quantitative requirement
looks at whether the bodily or mental harm has an actual impact on
the protected group. A qualitative test, however, looks to whether the
harm is of the nature so it could "destroy" the group, without
requiring proof of actual impact. For the reasons expressed below, the
test is best understood as a qualitative assessment.
First, the text of the Convention requires no demonstrated
impact on the protected group. By the Kayishema Trial Chamber,
'causing serious bodily harm' is self-explanatory."155 Commentators
agree. As expressed by William Schabas, "[t]his interpretation [i.e., a
quantitative test] goes beyond the plain words of the test, and is not
supported by the travaux prdparatoires."15 6 Kai Ambos and Gaeta
concur, stating respectively that "[s]uch a restrictive interpretation is
151. PAYAM AKHAvAN, REDUCING GENOCIDE To LAW 51-52 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2012).
152. ESCOR, Draft Convention, supra note 107, at 16.
153. Id.
154. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, Relation Between the Convention on
Genocide on the One Hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the
Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the Other, at 6,
U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1 (Apr. 12, 1948).
155. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 109 (May 21,
1999).
156. WILLIAM SCHABAs, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 182 (2009).
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not required by the plain wording of the provision"5 7 and "there are
no indications in the definition as to a requirement that the harm be
of such a serious nature as to threaten the group with destruction."58
Second, nothing in the Convention's legislative history suggests
that proof of impact was ever intended. The Sixth Committee
considered and rejected a proposal by Soviet Union representatives to
change the language from the then proposal of "[i]mpairing the
physical integrity of members of the group" to "[t]he physical
destruction in whole or in part of such groups."15 9 That proposal was
never seriously discussed and was criticized by representatives from
Egypt for confusing the mens rea element of the crime with its actus
reus.16 0
The only discussion weighing towards an impact requirement is
the disagreement had by certain representatives on whether
individual acts would meet the actus reus requirements for genocide.
For instance, some Sixth Committee delegates suggested that
individual acts would be genocidal if committed with the requisite
intent, clearly suggesting they did not intend showing impact on the
group. Representatives from Panama noted that the isolated killing of
one individual "would . . . be genocide if committed with the intent to
destroy a group."161 The French agreed: "the crime of genocide existed
as soon as an individual became the victim of acts of genocide. If a
motive for the crime existed, genocide existed even if only a single
individual were the victim."1 6 2 As reasoned by France's delegate,
Charles Chaumont, "[t]he group was an abstract concept; it was an
aggregate of individuals; it has no independent life of its own; it was
harmed when the individuals composing it were harmed."6 3
Representatives from the United States, Egypt, and the United
Kingdom, however, disagreed with this position. The United States
considered France's position to be overbroad,164 although note that
following the Convention's adoption, its own internal correspondence
157. KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw VOLUME II: THE
CRIMES AND SENTENCING 12-13 (2014) [hereinafter AMBOS TREATISE].
158. GAETA, supra note 79, at 9.
159. ESCOR, 3d Sess., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Amendments to
Article II of the Draft Convention, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/233 (Oct. 7, 1948).
160. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 81st mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.81 (Oct. 22,
1948) (criticized on grounds that the first part was duplicative and that the second part
of it singled out acts which were only an additional example of acts of physical
destruction listed in the first part).
161. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 62, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.69 (Oct. 7, 1948).
162. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 73d mtg. at 90, U.N. Doc. A/C/6/SR.73 (Oct. 13, 1948)
[hereinafter GAOR 73d Meeting].
163. Id. at 91.
164. See id. at 92 (stating that the concept of genocide should not be broadened to
cover cases where a single individual was attacked as a member of a group).
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recognized that genocide could be committed against a single
individual.165 Representatives from Egypt noted that "the idea of
genocide could hardly be reconciled with the idea of an attack on the
life of a single individual."1 66 Similarly, the United Kingdom argued
that "when a single individual was affected, it was a case of homicide,
whatever the intention of the perpetrator of the crime might be."'
67
This disagreement, at most, shows contention between the drafters
on whether individuals can be victims of genocidal acts. It does not,
however, suggest there was majority, let alone plenary, acceptance of
an impact requirement.
Third, none of the principal cases responsible for constructing
this test-Krajignik, Kajelijeli, and Seromba-ever conducted an
impact assessment, a matter recently confirmed in the Karadi6 Trial
Judgment.'6 8 To the contrary, the Krajignik Trial Chamber noted
that the usual definition of "[h]arm amounting to 'a grave and long-
term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and
constructive life' has been said to be sufficient."1
6 9 Neither in its
formulation or application of this principle did the Krajignik Chamber
mention or require any impact on the ground. Rather, the Trial
Chamber was concerned with placing the act of serious bodily or
mental harm within the framework of the other genocidal acts. In
this respect, it was strictly concerned with assessing the quality of
the act, not its impact. The Seromba Appeals Chamber similarly
recognized that individual acts can satisfy this requirement, noting
that individual incidents of rape and torture "obviously constitute
serious bodily or mental harm."1 70
Fourth, except for the Karadii6 Trial Chamber in its Rule 98 bis
Judgment,171 no other chamber endorsing the ILC or Krajignik tests
165. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. XXI,
No. 552 at 844, 846 (July 4, 1949) (drawing a distinction between homicide and
genocide, but acknowledging that if "an individual is murdered by another individual,
or by a group, whether composed of private citizens or government officials, as part of a
plan or with the intent to destroy one of the groups enumerated in article 2, the
international legal crime of genocide is committed as well as the municipal-law of
homicide").
166. GAOR 73d Meeting, supra note 162, at 92.
167. Id.
168. See Prosecutor v. Karadii6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 544 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016) (stating no judgments had
required a showing that the harm was such to threaten the group's destruction).
169. Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, T 862 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006).
170. Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment, ¶ 48 (Mar. 12,
2008).
171. See generally Prosecutor v. Karadii6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on
Accused's Application for Certification to Appeal Denial of Motion For Judgement of
Acquittal Under Rule 98 BIS (Count 11) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 18, 2012) (the Rule captures the ICTY's equivalence of a "no case to answer"
[voL. 51:13811412
SERIOUSBODILY OR MENTAL HARMAS GENOCIDE
has required proof that the physical or mental harm impact the
protected group.172 For instance, in finding that a victim of sexual
assault had suffered serious mental harm, the Rukundo Trial
Chamber never assessed the impact of the assault on the group.17 3
Instead, it qualitatively analyzed the harm on the individual
victim. 174 The Trial Chamber also found that the beating of two
children had met the threshold required for serious bodily harm,
despite no demonstrable impact on the group at large.175
This was also confirmed by the ICC. After surveying the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC
concluded that:
[under] the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR, the crime of genocide is
completed by . . . causing serious bodily harm to a single individual with the
intent to destroy in whole or in part the group to which such individual belongs.
As a result, according to this case law, for the purpose of completing the crime
of genocide, it is irrelevant whether the conduct in question is capable of posing
any concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group, or a part thereof.1 7 6
The Karaddi6 Trial Judgment recently reiterated this finding,
noting "the majority of trial judgements rendered prior to and after
the Seromba Appeal Judgement consistently reiterate the language of
Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute without requiring a showing that the
harm was such as to threaten the group's destruction." 77 Similarly,
in the very last ICTY trial decision, the Mladi6 Trial Judgment
concluded that the beatings and mistreatment of certain detainees
"caused serious mental and physical suffering and injury" but were
not "of such a serious nature as to contribute, or tend to contribute, to
motion, wherein the defense seeks the accused's acquittal following the conclusion of
the prosecution's case-in-chief on the basis that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is substantively insufficient to engage the need for the defense to mount a
case).
172. See id. ¶ 544 (noting Trial Chambers of the Tribunal and the ICTR have
only examined seriousness of acts without referring to any showing that the harm was
such as to threaten the group's destruction).
173. See Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Pocar, TT 388-89 (Oct. 20, 2010) (the Chambers focusing on the
impact of sexual assault on the victim).
174. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A, IT 234-38 (the ICTR Appeals Chamber
overturning the accused's conviction for this crime, but on the lack of sufficient
evidence demonstrating genocidal intent).
175. See Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, ¶ 569 (finding the accused guilty
on Count 1 of the Indictment).
176. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case. No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, 1 119 (Mar. 4, 2009).
177. Prosecutor v. Karadii6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 544 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016).
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the destruction of the protected groups."178 The Chamber never
assessed any actual impact on the group. The language, instead, was
geared toward assessing the qualitative nature of the harm.
Two decisions, however, are worth exploring as they may be
misinterpreted as adopting an impact assessment: he Tolimir Appeal
Judgment and the ICJ's Croatia Genocide Judgment. In Tolimir, an
Appeals Chamber determined that the Trial Chamber had erred in
finding that the acts inflicted against the Bosnian Muslim population
of Zepa had resulted in serious mental harm as an act of genocide.
After endorsing the ILC and Krajidnik tests,179 the Appeals Chamber
reasoned that "the emotional pain and distress inflicted upon Zepa's
Bosnian Muslims was irrefutably grave" but there was "no evidence
of any long-term psychological trauma."1 8 0 The Chamber also
reasoned that the Trial Chamber had "failed to point to any evidence
on the record establishing that the mental harm suffered by that
group tended to contribute to the destruction of the Muslims of
Eastern [Bosnia] as such."18 1
At first blush, the Tolimir Appeals Chamber adopts an impact
requirement insofar as the Chamber treats the Trial Chamber's
failure to find evidence that the harm contributed to the group as an
error besides the Trial Chamber's failure to find that the harm met a
qualitative threshold (i.e., the causing of long-term psychological
trauma). The Appeals Chamber appears to adopt a similar distinction
in another of its findings when it determines there was an "absence of
findings or references to evidence of any long-term consequences of
the forcible transfer operation . .. and of a link between the
circumstances of the transfer operation in Zepa and the physical
destruction of the protected group as a whole."
1 82
A holistic reading of the judgment, however, suggests that the
Appeals Chamber was simply emphasizing the qualitative threshold
required for the actus reus without adopting a quantitative
requirement. Any other interpretation would render the Appeal
Judgment incomprehensible and contradictory. The Appeals
Chamber sustains findings by the Trial Chamber as meeting the
ILC/Krajidnik test clearly about the quality of the harm and not its
impact on the group. This includes the Trial Chamber's conclusion
that the forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslim women, children, and
178. Prosecutor v. Mladi6, Case No. IT-09-92-T, Judgment, ¶ 3450 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2017).
179. Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, 1 203 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012) (stating serious mental harm must be of
such a serious nature as to contribute or tend to contribute to the destruction of all or
part of the group).
180. Id. ¶ 215.
181. Id. ¶ 217.
182. Id.
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elderly from Srebrenica with attendant circumstances caused serious
mental harm because "the lives of the displaced population
'drastically changed,' while some women have been 'so profoundly
traumatized that they prefer to die."'"8 3 Based on this finding, the
Appeals Chamber concludes that the Trial Chamber "did make
findings satisfying the requirement that the harm suffered be of such
a nature that it tends to contribute to the destruction of the protected
group as such."1 84 The Appeals Chamber did not require, or identify,
any findings that those harms affected the group, suggesting that
evidence of such impact is unnecessary.
A similar reading can be drawn from the ICJ's Croatia Genocide
Judgment. There, the ICJ endorsed a test similar to the
ILC/Krajignik test. However, the ICJ test contains one critical
distinction, although likely indeliberate. The ILC/Krajignik test is
largely conceptual. The harm is sufficient if it "tends to contribute" to
the group's destruction. The ICJ omits this language suggesting that
the harm to the group must be concrete; that the harm "contribute to
the physical or biological destruction of the group."1 85 Despite this
difference, there is no suggestion that the ICJ intended to create an
impact requirement or depart from the ILC/Krajignik test as
interpreted by the ad hoc tribunals. This is evident from the fact that
the ICJ relies upon the ILC Commentary and ICTY jurisprudence, "in
particular . . . the Krajignik case."86 The ICJ also references the
Convention's legislative history,'8 7 which equally omits any impact
assessment but focuses on the quality of the harm. Further, like
Seromba, the ICJ recognizes that individual acts can satisfy this
requirement, noting that "rape and other acts of sexual violence are
capable of constitut[ing] the actus reus of genocide within the
meaning of Article II (b) of the Convention."*8 8 Read as a whole, the
ICJ test, while textually different from Krajignik, was intended to
comport with, not depart from, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals.89
Fifth, an impact requirement was rejected in the Karaddi6 98 bis
Appeal Judgment. In Karadid6, the Trial Chamber, at the no case to
183. Id. T 212.
184. Id.
185. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 118, ¶ 157 (Feb. 3,
2015) (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. Id. (commenting on representatives' viewpoints in the drafting process).
188. Id. ¶ 158.
189. See Caroline Fournet, The Actus Reus of Genocide in the Croatia v. Serbia
Judgment: Between Legality and Acceptability, 28 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 915, 919 (2015)
(noting that the definition of "serious mental harm" was elaborated in the ad hoc
tribunals).
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answer stage (rule 98 bis of the ICTY Statute), observed there was
evidence indicating that Bosnian Serb forces had caused serious
bodily or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
detained in detention facilities.'9 0 That evidence, as noted by the
prosecution in its appeal and the Karad;iid Appeals Chamber,
demonstrated that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were
kicked, violently beaten with a range of objects, thrown down stairs,
raped, and sexually assaulted.19 ' The evidence also showed that
because of these attacks, the victims suffered serious injuries,
including bone fractures, concussions, tooth loss, permanent
headaches, facial deformities, partial paralysis, chronic leg pain, and
deformed fingers.'9 2 But the Trial Chamber concluded that it had
"not heard evidence, even taken at its highest, which could support a
conclusion by a reasonable trier of fact that the harm caused reached
a level where it contributed to or tended to contribute to the
destruction of the Bosnian Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats in whole
or in part."'93
As argued by the prosecution on appeal, the Trial Chamber in
effect imported an impact threshold by "requiring the serious bodily
or mental harm to achieve a certain level of destructive impact on the
protected group as a whole."1 94 While not explicitly addressing this
specific argument, the Karaddi6 Appeals Chamber implicitly endorsed
the prosecution's position. The Appeals Chamber found that the
evidence reviewed by the Trial Chamber "indicates that Bosnian
Muslims and/or Bosnian Croats suffered injuries, including rape and
severe non-fatal physical violence which are, on their face, suggestive
of causing serious bodily harm."9 5 The Appeals Chamber never
required or analyzed whether this harm impacted the protected
group, a matter confirmed by the Karadii6 Trial Chamber: "the
Appeals Chamber in the Rule 98 bis Appeal Judgement simply
recalled Article 4(2)(b) without indicating the existence of an
additional requirement."196
190. See Prosecutor v. Karadii6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Accused's
Application for Certification to Appeal Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Under Rule 98 BIS (Count 11), ¶ 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 18,
2012) (further stating that UN personnel were rendered hors de combat by virtue of
their detention by the Bosnian Serb forces and therefore became protected persons).
191. Prosecutor v. Karad~ii, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1, Reply Brief for
Appeal of Decision on Remand, ¶¶ 35-36 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Aug. 13, 2013) (detailing violence towards Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats).
192. See id. ¶ 35 (detailing injuries sustained by victims).
193. Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
194. Prosecutor v. Karadii, Case No. IT-95-5/19AR98bis.1, Prosecution Rule
98bis Appeal Brief, T 28 (Sept. 24, 2012).
195. Karadiid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1, ¶ 37.
196. Prosecutor v. Karadii, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, T 544 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016).
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The Appeals Chamber also found that
[w]hile the commission of paradigmatic acts does not automatically
demonstrate that the actus reus of genocide has taken place, the Appeals
Chamber considers that no reasonable trial chamber reviewing the specific
evidence on the record in this case, including evidence of sexual violence and of
beatings causing serious physical injuries, could have concluded that it was
insufficient to establish the actus reus of genocide.
1 97
The first half of the Appeals Chamber's reasoning is equivocal-the
Appeals Chamber never explains "paradigmatic acts" or why they
may be insufficient. The Chamber also cites to no authority
supporting its proposition. Nor has that language been invoked where
serious bodily or mental harm has been raised, including in the
Tolimir Appeal Judgment, the Croatia Genocide Judgment, and the
Karadii6 Trial Judgment.
One reading could be that evidence of individual acts meeting
the requisite level of harm would not meet the ILC/Krajignik test.
This would import an impact requirement of the nature adopted by
the Trial Chamber. That would, however, render the Appeal
Judgment internally inconsistent, given that the Appeals Chamber
implicitly rejected an impact requirement, as illustrated above.
Instead, a reading that comports with the Judgment when taken as a
whole is that the Appeals Chamber is simply re-emphasizing the need
to take caution before classifying individual acts as meeting the
threshold required to be an act of genocide. This comports with the
Appeals Chamber's conclusion that, generally, the "quintessential
examples of serious bodily harm as an underlying act of genocide
include torture, rape, and non-fatal physical violence that causes
disfigurement or serious injury to the external or internal organs."*9
Sixth and finally, an impact requirement conflates the mens rea
of the crime with its actus reus. This is the primary criticism
advanced by Schabas and Ambos. By Schabas, an impact requirement
"indicates a confusion between the mental element of the chapeau
and the material element of paragraph (b)."1 9 9 Ambos agrees, an
impact requirement "ignores the structure of genocide as a specific
intent crime, which implies that the perpetrator's mens rea exceeds
the actus reus."20 0
Altogether, the above arguments support the conclusion recently
drawn in the Karadii6 Trial Judgment that "there is no additional
requirement that the serious bodily or mental harm to members of
197. KaradEi6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1, ¶ 37.
198. Id. T 33.
199. SCHABAS, supra note 156.
200. AMBOS TREATISE, supra note 157, at 13.
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the group be of such serious nature as to threaten the destruction of
the group in whole or in part."201 Rather, "[t]he degree of threat to the
group's destruction may, however, be considered as a measure of the
seriousness of the bodily or mental harm."202 That analysis comports
perfectly with the analysis above and, uncoincidentally, the
prosecution's position throughout the Karadii6 proceedings.
203
V. CONCLUSION
The object and purpose of the Convention is to prevent and to
punish the crime of genocide, regardless of its form.204 With this in
mind, the Convention's drafters ensured that the Convention not only
covered acts emblematic of the genocide of European Jews during the
Second World War, but to ensure that any conduct directed toward
the destruction of one of the protected groups was prevented and
punished. The actus reus of serious bodily and mental harm provided
the greatest flexibility in this respect. It permitted international
courts and tribunals to ensure a progressive understanding of the
crime: one that captures acts of sexual violence and the forced
displacement of populations, and acts over a broad spectrum of time.
Precisely because of this breadth, however, the act is under
increasing scrutiny by advocates and jurists who wish to ensure that
it fits within the overall parameters of the crime, namely to ensure
against the physical or biological destruction of national, ethnic,
religious, or racial groups. The preceding discussion comprehensively
evaluates these issues and puts forward resolutions to some of the
main criticisms and open questions in the jurisprudence. In doing so,
it balances the Convention's plain terms and the intent of its framers
to narrow the act to only that conduct capable of bringing about the
protected group's destruction. But there are further questions
requiring exploration that may further our understanding of serious
201. Karadiid, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, ¶ 544.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. KaradEi6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on
Accused's Application for Certification to Appeal Denial of Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal Under Rule 98 BIS (Count 11), 1 24-28 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 18, 2012) 8 (recognizing "the long line of ICTY and ICTR cases which
have followed the plain wording of Article 4(2)(b) without requiring any additional
element of threatening the destruction of a protected group").
204. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 118, ¶ 139 (Feb. 3,
2015) (stating a mission of "liberat[ing] mankind from such an odious scourge"); see
also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 15, at 12 (May 28, 1951) (stating that the
"origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to
condemn and punish genocide").
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bodily or mental harm as an act of genocide. This includes
determining whether there is a difference between serious bodily or
mental harm as an act of genocide and as an underlying act for other
international crimes.
As alluded to above, the actus reus of serious bodily and mental
harm is not exclusive to the crime of genocide. As reflected in the
ICC's Elements of Crimes, variations of the act also constitute
underlying conduct for the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment,
inhumane treatment, willful causing of great suffering, biological
experiments, medical or scientific experiments, and mutilation20 5 and
crimes against humanity covering similar crimes.206 Even though the
underlying acts are ostensibly the same, it is entirely possible that
certain harms may, for instance, amount to torture, but not meet the
threshold required to be an act of genocide. Resolving such issues will
provide greater clarity on the scope of the act, and help resolve the
larger debate permeating much of the jurisprudence of whether
genocidal acts should be viewed in light of their context, or by their
terms sensu stricto.
205. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES arts. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1, (2)(a)(ii)-2,
8(2)(a)(ii)-3, 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(b)(x)-1, 8(2)(b)(x)-2, 8(2)(e)(xi)-1, 8(2)(e)(xi)-2, 8(2)(c)(i)-3,
8(2)(c)(i)-4 (2002), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM7R-D5DV
(archived Sept. 18, 2018).
206. Id. arts. 7(1)(f, 7(1)(k).
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ANNEX: Legislative History of "Serious Bodily or Mental Harm" in
Chronological Form
Deliberations before the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide
Secretariat Draft "Mutilations and biological
experiments imposed with
(E/447) no curative purpose"
Proposal by the US "Physical violence,
mutilations or biological
(A/401 & E/623) experiments"
Proposal by France "Any acts directed against Adopted by 5 votes
the corporeal integrity of to 1, with 1
(E/AC.25/SR.13) the members of a group." abstention
Proposal by Ad Hoc a
Committee Chairman "Any act impairing the Adopted by 5 votes
physical integrity of ,, to 2
(EIAC.25/SR.24) members of the group"
"Impairing the physical
Proposal by China integrity or mentalcapacity of members of the
(E/AC.25/SR.28) group" or "Impairing thehealth of members of the
group"
Proposal by Ad Hoc
Committee on "Impairing the physical Adopted by 5 votes
Genocide integrity of members of the to 1, with 1
group" abstention
(E/794 & E/AC.25/12)
Deliberations before the General Assembly's Sixth Committee
Proposal by the
USSR "The physical destruction in
whole or in part of such groups"
(A/C.6/215/Rev. 1)
Proposal by
Belgium "Impairing physical integrity"
(A/C.6/217)
Proposal by China ',Impairing the physical or
(AIC.61221 & mental health of members of
A/C.6/221/Corr.1) the group"
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With Indian
Proposal by UK amendment:
"Causing grievous bodily harm Adopted by 24
(A/C.6/222) to members of the group" votes to 10,
with 7
abstentions
Proposal by the "The physical destruction in
USSR whole or in part of such groups;
for example, [...] the infliction of
(A/C.6/223 & physical injury or pursuit of





Proposal by China "impairing the physical or
mental health of members of With Indian





Proposal by India "Causing serious bodily or
(A/C.6/244) mental harm to members of the
group
Proposal by Sixth Committee "Causing serious bodily or mental
(A/C.6/245) harm to members of the group"
Adopted Text "Causing serious bodily or mental
(A/C.6/289 and harm to members of the group"
A/C.6/289/Corr.1)
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